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Volume 36 • No. 1 • (Printemps 2001 Spring) Liberalism and the Limits of Multic

Volume 36 • No. 1 • (Printemps 2001 Spring) Liberalism and the Limits of Multiculturalism Raphael Cohen-Almagor One of the most pressing issues facing liberal democracies today is the politicization of ethnocul- tural diversity. Minority cultures are demanding greater public recognition of their distinctive identities and greater freedom and opportunity to retain and develop their distinctive cultural prac- tices. In response to these demands, new and creative mechanisms are being adopted in many coun- tries for accommodating difference. This essay discusses some of the issues raised by these demands, focussing in particular on the difficulties that arise when the minority seeking accommodation is illiberal. Undoubtedly, ethnocultural relations are often full of complications that defy simple cat- egories or easy answers; however, we can make some progress if we draw some distinctions between different kinds of groups and different kinds of group rights. This essay probes the nature of liberal tolerance and then delineates the limits of state intervention by looking at some troubling prac- tices and analyzing pertinent court judgements. L’une des questions les plus pressantes à laquelle doivent faire face les démocraties libérales d’aujourd’hui, c’est la politisation de la diversité ethnoculturelle. Les cultures minoritaires exigent une plus grande reconnaissance publique de leur identité culturelle, ainsi qu’une plus grande liberté et davantage d’occasions qui leur permettent de conserver et de développer leurs pratiques culturelles distinctives. En réponse à ces demandes, on adopte, dans de nombreux pays, de nouveaux mécanismes créatifs aﬁn de composer avec cette différence. Le présent article traite de certaines des questions que suscitent ces demandes, en particulier les difficultés qui surgissent lorsque la minorité recherchant une adaptation n’est pas libérale. Il ne fait pas de doute que les relations ethnoculturelles sont souvent compliquées, et que ces complications dépassent une catégorisation simple ou les réponses faciles. Cependant, il nous est possible de progresser si nous savons faire la distinction entre les différentes sortes de minorités et les différents types de droits de ces minorités. Nous examinons la nature de la tolérance libérale, et nous déterminons ensuite les limites de l’intervention étatique en jetant un regard sur certaines pratiques troublantes ainsi qu’en analysant des jugements judiciaires pertinents. 80 Raphael Cohen-Almagor O ne of the most pressing issues facing liberal democracies today is the politi- cization of ethnocultural diversity. Minority cultures are demanding greater public recognition of their distinctive identities, and greater free- dom and opportunity to retain and develop their distinctive cultural practices. In response to these demands, new and creative mechanisms are being adopted in many countries for accommodating difference. This essay discusses some of the issues raised by these demands, focussing in particular on the difficulties that arise in North America when the minority seeking accommodation is illiberal. How should liberal societies approach illiberal, but non-violent, minorities? It is increasingly accepted that these common rights of citizenship are not suf- ﬁcient to accommodate all forms of ethnocultural diversity. In some cases, certain “collective” or “group-differentiated” rights also are required. Indeed there is a clear trend within liberal democracies towards the greater recognition of such group-dif- ferentiated rights. Yet this trend raises a number of important issues, both theo- retical and practical. How are these group rights related to individual rights? What should we do if group rights come into conﬂict with individual rights? Can a lib- eral democracy allow minority groups to restrict the individual rights of their members, or should it insist that all groups uphold liberal principles? These are genuinely difficult questions. Ethnocultural relations are often full of complications that defy simple categories or easy answers. Virtually all liberal democracies contain some degree of ethnocultural diversity. They can all be described, therefore, as “multicultural.” This essay probes group rights and the nature of liberal tolerance. I proceed by delineating the limits of state intervention. The article will draw from the philos- ophy of John Rawls in order to examine the limits of liberal tolerance. Then, a dis- tinction is drawn between internalized and designated coercion and, ﬁnally, the Hofer v. Hofer case is analyzed, illustrating the appropriate liberal approach to face the problem of dissenters who wish to leave their religious community. Probing Group Rights Both immigrant groups and national minorities are, in different ways, seeking legal recognition of their ethnocultural identities and practices. These demands are often described, by both their defenders and critics, in the language of “group rights.” Defenders, however, typically describe group rights as supplementing indi- vidual rights, and hence as enriching and extending traditional liberal principles to deal with new challenges, whereas critics tend to assume that group rights involve restricting individual rights, and hence threaten basic liberal democratic principles. 81 Journal of Canadian Studies • Revue d’études canadiennes The relationship between individual rights and group rights is not a simple one and we need to take into account the different claims that are involved. First, we have to distinguish between cases in which one is inﬂicting pain or death upon oneself and cases in which one is inﬂicting damage upon others. This distinction is made in the framework of the traditional liberal dichotomy between self- and other-regarding conduct. Consider in this context the Jainas practice in relation to the dying. The practice permits a member of the community, under certain cir- cumstances, to terminate his or her own life, or more accurately, to welcome impending death in a non-violent manner. Thus persons in the late stages of their lives may decide that they want to die and undertake the vow of terminal fast (Bilimoria 331-55). Another relevant conduct involves scarring parts of the body as part of initi- ation rites, which is common in some African cultures. Let us assume that some immigrants bring these rituals to a liberal democracy. I argue that the liberal state has no strong case for interference. These customs of self-starvation and scarring should not be promoted and encouraged by the liberal state, but since the sub- cultures possess historical claims and strongly believe in their traditional practices and norms, they should be granted cultural autonomy in these regards.1 Of course, all forms of government restrict the liberty of citizens (e.g., paying taxes, undertaking jury duty or military service). Even the most liberal of democ- racies imposes such restrictions in order to uphold individual rights and democ- ratic institutions. But some groups seek to impose much greater restrictions, not in order to maintain liberal institutions, but rather to protect religious orthodoxy or cultural tradition. Sociological analysis of various societies reveals that many groups seek the legal right to restrict the freedom of their own members in the name of group solidarity or cultural purity. When one examines rituals around the globe, it is almost always the case that women are being discriminated against: sut- tee (widow burning), arranged marriage, female infanticide, as well as female cir- cumcision and murder for family honour are such examples.2 Women are required to pay a high price for the norm of male dominance. Group rights are invoked by theocratic and patriarchal cultures where women are oppressed and religious ortho- doxy enforced. This obviously raises the danger of individual oppression. At the same time there is a danger that claims for group rights may override law and order. In the name of preserving culture and protecting a sense of community a demand is raised against society not to interfere even when the most atrocious injustices take place. In our view, such internal restrictions are almost always unjust.3 Groups are free, of course, to impose certain restrictions as conditions for membership in vol- untary associations, but it is unjust to use governmental power, or the distribution of public beneﬁts, to restrict the liberty of members. From a liberal point of view, who- ever exercises political power in a community must respect the civil and political rights 82 Raphael Cohen-Almagor of its members. Furthermore, members of cultural groups should enjoy the liberty to leave their groups upon deciding that they no longer want to associate them- selves with the group. People in democratic societies should be free to move in and out of their cultural communities and should not be coerced to stay in order to serve the partisan interests of others. This, as we said, is especially true for women who live in a chauvinist, discriminatory environment. It is our contention that some things lie beyond the toleration of liberal democ- racies. Democracy cannot endure norms that deny respect to people and that are designed to harm others, although they might be dictated by some cultures. Some norms are considered by liberal standards to be intrinsically wrong by their very nature. These are norms that result in physical harm to women and babies, such as widow burning, female infanticide, harsh forms of female circumcision (like the Pharaonic circumcision that involves the excision of the clitoris, the labia minora and parts of the labia majora)4 and murder for family honour (Cohen-Almagor “Female Circumcision”). That is to say that the right of a group against its own members is not absolute. Sometimes uploads/Societe et culture/ liberalism-and-the-limits-of-multiculturalism.pdf