Traître au colonialisme? The Georges Boudarel Affair and the Memory of the Indo
Traître au colonialisme? The Georges Boudarel Affair and the Memory of the Indochina War M. Kathryn Edwards French Colonial History, Volume 11, 2010, pp. 193-209 (Article) Published by Michigan State University Press For additional information about this article Access Provided by Cornell University at 01/21/11 7:37PM GMT http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/fch/summary/v011/11.edwards.html · · · · · · " M. Kathryn Edwards is a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Toronto whose research interests center on issues of history and memory, particularly within the context of French colonial history. Her dissertation focuses on the stakes and expressions of the construction of the public memory of the Indochina War in France from 1954 to 2006, and examines official and unofficial com- memoration of the war, as well as a series of “flashpoints” that have been central to the revival of awareness of the conflict, and have also contributed to greater debates over the value of the French colonial project. French Colonial History, Vol. 11, 2010, pp. 193–210. issn 1539-3402. © 2010 French Colonial Historical Society. All rights reserved. Traître au colonialisme? % e Georges Boudarel Aff air and the Memory of the Indochina War M. KATHRYN EDWARDS University of Toronto Le 13 février 1991, le Professeur Georges Boudarel a été interpelé, lors d’un congrès au Sénat sur “L’actualité vietnamienne,” par un groupe d’anciens combattants, qui l’ont accusé d’avoir été ‘commissaire politique’ dans le camp Viêt minh 113 et d’être ainsi responsable d’un nombre élevé de morts. “L’affaire Boudarel” a éclaté, provoquant un débat public intense, centré non seulement sur les actions de Boudarel (qu’il qualifiait lui-même d’anticoloniales), mais sur la nature de la guerre d’Indochine et les mérites du projet colonial. La complexité de la guerre, qui était à la fois une guerre coloniale et un point chaud de la guerre froide, a retenti dans ces débats, les défenseurs de Boudarel insistant sur la nature coloniale du conflit, tandis que ses détracteurs ne reconnaissaient que l’objectif anticom- muniste des forces françaises. Cet article analyse les débats concernant la nature de la guerre, ainsi que les enjeux médiatiques de la question de la ‘mémoire’ de la guerre d’Indochine, avant d’élargir la discussion afin de replacer l’affaire Boudarel dans le contexte plus large de la question mémorielle en France. " M. Kathryn Edwards O n 13 February 1991, just as he was about to present his paper for a confer- ence on Vietnamese current affairs at the Sénat in Paris, Professor Georges Boudarel was interrupted by a member of the audience who accused him of having been a guard in a Viet Minh camp for French prisoners during the Indochina War, and for therefore having blood on his hands (“du sang sur les mains”),1 given the high mortality rate. The accuser was Jean-Jacques Beucler, a former prisoner of war and secrétaire d’État aux Anciens Combattants under Valérie Giscard-d’Estaing, accompanied by a small group of other veterans. The accusations sparked a media campaign against him (what one politician dubbed a “lynchage médiatique”)2 that lasted several months and more importantly led to a charge of crimes against humanity, which ultimately resulted in a dismissal (non-lieu). While he publicly acknowledged his involvement with the Viet Minh and his role as a propaganda instructor at Camp 113, Boudarel defended his ac- tions as having been rooted in anticolonialism rather than in treason or sadism, as had been claimed by his critics. The “Boudarel Affair,” as it came to be known, reveals a great deal about the memory of the Indochina War, as well as the relationship of the French with their colonial past. The affair was both indicative of a slowly re-emerging inter- est in the colonial period as well as the wars of decolonization, and the source of a renewed debate over the nature of the Indochina conflict itself. Though it garnered considerable attention, the affair should be viewed as a “flashpoint” of memory rather than a turning point, given that it did not contribute to a major shift in awareness or interpretations of the war comparable to the “breaking of the mirror” of the so-called Vichy syndrome.3 The affair’s presence in the public eye did, however, provoke considerable debate about broader issues of collabo- ration, treason, and the collective memory of war and decolonization. Analysis of the affair, then, must address a number of elements: first and foremost, it must address the ensuing debates over the nature of the Indochina War, as well as the debates over the merits of the colonial project. Through a close analysis of the press, I will demonstrate that pro- and anti-Boudarel groups frequently understood the war in different terms, which inhibited any productive dialogue from taking place. Disagreements over whether the war was primarily a war of colonial reconquest or a struggle against communism were also inherently tied to varied interpretations of the French colonial system in Indochina. Second, the affair must be examined within the context of the renewed commitment in the late eighties and early nineties to the “duty to remember.” This memorial Traître au colonialisme? " emphasis meant that the affair acted as a catalyst for discussions of France’s “forgotten” colonial wars, and became yet another example for commentators of a French inability to face the national past. Furthermore, the timing of the affair, which coincided roughly with the arrest and trials of several Vichy collaborators accused of having committed crimes against humanity, ensured that Boudarel’s actions would be compared to, and even conflated with, the actions of collabo- rators. Finally, the collapse of the Soviet bloc encouraged a desire for some to stage a thorough assessment of the communist system through a “Nuremberg trial of communism,” and Boudarel provided a timely target. The objectives of this study mark a departure from the existing historiography. The two existing monographs on the subject are critical investigations of Boudarel’s past, and both authors use their studies to attack the French Communist Party (PCF).4 The approach taken in this article has much more in common with Malika Rebbani’s master’s thesis, which explores the affair and the impact of social and political factors, and work by Gilles Bataillon, Jean-Philippe Béja, and Alain Léger,5 which suggests that the affair could be used as a platform for a public discussion of the colonial past and demands that the relevant archives be opened. · · · · · · Georges Boudarel was born in Saint-Étienne (Loire) in 1926. An adolescent during the Second World War, he claims that he had sympathized with the Resistance (though he did not join), despite the Pétainist leanings of his father and his teachers. Educated by the Marists, Boudarel entered the seminary in 1943; six months into his second year, he left his studies, claiming that he had lost his faith. He later took up membership in the PCF, becoming more involved in party activities in the fall of 1947. Seeking colonial adventure, he applied for several positions in Madagascar, but was unsuccessful. Disappointed, but un- willing to give up on his dream, a young Boudarel boarded the Pasteur in April 1948, bound for Saigon and a post teaching philosophy. He had been advised by the party to leave his membership card in France, but he was given contact information for members of the Groupe Culturel Marxiste in Saigon. Though he had longed to experience life in the colonies since childhood, he claims he quickly became completely disenchanted with colonial society, viewing it as racist and exploitative. After making contact with representatives of the Viet Minh, Boudarel crossed over in December 1950. Initially assigned to work in " M. Kathryn Edwards radio doing broadcasts in French, he received orders to travel to prisoner of war Camp 113, located in the Ha Giang region of the north, to take up the posi- tion of propaganda instructor. After a long trek northward, he arrived at the site in early 1953. Camp 113 was one of many camps built (often by the inmates themselves) to house prisoners of war. Captivity involved a grueling schedule of manual labor and political education, made more difficult by a lack of proper nutrition and rampant tropical disease. Boudarel was responsible for “educat- ing” the prisoners about Communist doctrine, and more importantly about the necessity of ending the war and repatriating the Corps Expéditionnaire (CEFEO). According to former prisoners, Boudarel also played a role in decid- ing who was eligible for release, and supported a food reward system according to which those who performed best in the education sessions would be given larger rations. All parties agree that the death rate in Camp 113, as in most of the camps, was extremely high, and was due in large part to malnutrition and a plethora of tropical diseases for which there was little to no medical treatment; the medical reports on the state of liberated prisoners certainly attest to the ap- palling condition of survivors.6 Boudarel remained at 113 until 1954, settling in Hanoi after the First Indochina War. By his own account, Boudarel grew increasingly disillusioned with the Vietnamese Communist uploads/S4/ 10-2-edwards-2010-the-georges-boudarel-affaire.pdf
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- Publié le Mai 15, 2021
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